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11 Introduction
Much costly economic activity ￿ be it litigation, advertising, lobbying, electoral
campaigning or argumentation in policy debates or within organizations ￿ could
be thought of as being about persuasion. All such activities involve interested par-
ties devoting resources to in￿ uence the opinion of an audience ￿a court, voters,
consumers, fellow employees, the public at large ￿in their favor. Unlike the case
of ordinary economic production, in which inputs are combined cooperatively, the
inputs of persuasion are contributed by interested parties usually in an adversarial
fashion. Ordinary production functions could hardly, then, describe the process by
which the inputs of persuasion are translated into outputs. We argue that, instead,
persuasion could better be thought of as a contest, a game in which players invest
in costly e⁄ort to win a prize.
Indeed there are sizable literatures in di⁄erent areas, in certain cases isolated from
one another, that treat persuasion as a contest. Perhaps the most well-known area is
that of rent-seeking and lobbying that started with Tullock (1980) (see Nitzan, 1994,
for a review). Earlier, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was an extensive research e⁄ort
on advertising (see, e.g., Schmalensee, 1972) and for decades there has been extensive
related research on marketing (Bell et. al., 1975). More recently there has been
research using contests in the study of litigation (Farmer and Pecorino 1999, Bernardo
et. al., 2000, Hirshleifer and Osborne, 2001), political campaigns (Baron, 1994,
Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995), bureaucratic organization and corporate governance
(Warneryd, 1998, Mueller and Warneryd, 2001, Konrad, 2004), or media politics
(Vaidya, 2005, 2006).
A common ingredient of research in contests is the contest success function, the
function that translates e⁄orts into probabilities of winning and losing for the partici-
pating contestants. Such probabilistic choice functions have been explored since Luce
(1959). In the case of contest success functions, there are three types of derivations:
axiomatic (Bell et.al, 1975, Skaperdas, 1996, Clark and Riis, 1998), stochastic (Hir-
shleifer and Riley, 1992, p.380 and Jia, 2007), and those with microfoundations on
innovation-type of races (Fullerton and McAfee, 1999, and Baye and Hoppe, 2003).
2(For more detailed comparisons, see the illuminating survey of Konrad, 2007). None
of these derivations, however, considers the role of the audience as an active partici-
pant in the persuasion process.
Our primary aim in this paper is to derive contest success functions used in
the literature from the inferential process of an audience that observes evidence
produced by the contestants who seek to persuade the audience of the correctness
of their respective views. The main class of functional forms that have been used is





where Ri and Rj are resources expended by contestants i and j; f(￿) is a posi-
tive, increasing function, and Pi represents contestant i￿ s probability of winning. We
derive the functional form in (1) and its variations as an outcome of an audience￿ s in-
ference process when evidence production is deterministic and the contestants have a
continuous probability distribution over the audience￿ s priors. When the contestants
know the audience￿ s priors with certainty, we obtain the limiting case of the perfectly
discriminating contest or the all-pay auction, whereby the contestant who puts more
resources into the contest wins with certainty (see Hillman and Riley, 1989, Baye et.
al., 1996, Che and Gale, 1998). Thus, we ￿nd a clean set of circumstances to which
the imperfectly and perfectly discriminating contests might apply.
Furthermore, we examine a simple stochastic evidence production process which,







[h(Ri) ￿ h(Rj)] (2)
where h(￿) is a positive, increasing function (with appropriately de￿ned bounds),
￿ > 0; and the other variables and functions are similarly de￿ned to those in (1).
While this functional form bears resemblance to the one analyzed by Che and Gale
(2000), we are the ￿rst to provide an explicit inferential foundation for such a contest
function. Also, unlike Che and Gale (2000), in general, (2) allows for a non-linear
3relationship between probability of winning and resources devoted by rival parties.
Also, for both classes of functional forms that we derive, we ￿nd intuitively ap-
pealing ways in which the truth, the biases and preconceptions of the audience, as
well as the resources expended by the contestants a⁄ects the probabilities that the
audience will choose one of the alternatives.
While competition among parties to in￿ uence an audience bears a resemblance to
the literature on special interest politics, in our context these e⁄orts are not simply
money exchanged or bribes (as in Grossman and Helpman, 1994) but rather inputs
into production of arguments and evidence. The literature on rent-seeking contests
also tends to interpret the e⁄orts as bribes, or at least it is agnostic about what the
e⁄orts are. Our derivation of contest functions as ￿persuasion￿functions at least
makes us think seriously about distinguishing between outright bribing and informa-
tion provision and that these two types of in￿ uence might have distinct e⁄ects.1
Throughout the analysis, we suppose that the audience makes inferences solely
based on the evidence that it sees, and does not even attempt to infer who or how
the evidence might have been produced.2 Juries and judges are formally closest to
such an assumption, but we think in other instances of persuasion it is a reasonable
approximation, especially when compared to another extreme in which the audience
would have full knowledge of (or, a probability distribution over) the objectives and
strategies of probable or possible contestants far removed from the audience itself.3
There is a considerable amount of research in psychology and related areas indicating
1Campaign contributions are di⁄erent from the salaries of lobbyists and the costs of maintaining
o¢ ces. Campaign contributions can be thought of as a combination of bribes and the buying of
access, the latter allowing the lobbyists to make their arguments, whereas the other costs of lobbying
could be thought as being costs of persuasion. It would be reasonable then to conjecture that the
cost of bribing is only a small fraction of the costs of persuasion that have to be undertaken.
2In this respect, our approach is similar to Mullainathan Schwartzstien and Shleifer(2006) who
also examine a case where the target of persuasion takes the messages at their face value without
concerns of credibility even though the objective of the party sending messages need not be aligned
with his own. Froeb and Kobayashi (1996) also assume their decision maker to be naive who takes
evidence at face value ignoring strategic suppresion of unfavourable evidence although their line of
enquiry is quite di⁄erent from ours.
3Recent research in game theory (e.g., Filiz, 2006, Ozbay, 2006) explicitly allows for a subset of
the players to be ￿unaware￿of the full strategy space as perceived by some other players.
4that audiences, in making inferences from messages they receive, do focus on less than
the full universe of those who might produce the messages and their motivations
(for an overview of research in this area, see Cialdini, 2001). People are a⁄ected
by what they see ￿the product or candidate commercial, the trial evidence, the
arguments made by their colleagues in their organization ￿without considering all the
imaginable, let alone all the unimaginable but real, possibilities and contingencies.
In other words, they can be considered to inhabit a ￿limited world￿where they might
not question all the possible strategic reasons that some of the messages that they
observe might be generated. There is also considerable practice in the area of public
relations, advertising, and the formation of public opinion, at least since the 1920s
(see Lippmann, 1997, for one pioneer in the area), with insights similar to those of
psychology and related areas.
Our focus is rather di⁄erent from other work in economics that considers persua-
sion as transmission of private information. This literature examines persuasion as
communication of privately observed information by one or more agents to a decision
maker so as to in￿ uence his or her judgement on a matter at hand in their favour.
Since the objective of the decision maker is not necessarily aligned with those of the
agents, the latter may have an incentive to transmit only information that might tilt
the decision in their favor. One branch of this literature examines the case where
acquiring private information is costless for agents and uncovers conditions or mech-
anisms that might allow the decision maker to best extract the relevant information
from the agents so as to minimize or eliminate the prospect of a wrong decision (see
Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). Froeb and Kobayashi (1996) also pursue this line of
enquiry but by allowing for information acquisition to be costly for the participants.
By incorporating costly collection of information by agents, yet another branch of
the literature examines properties of optimal contracts or institutions that the de-
cision maker could adopt to cope with the dual issues of providing incentives for
information acquisition as well as discouraging the agents to manipulate the commu-
nicated information in their favour when their payo⁄s depend on the decision made
(see Dewatripoint and Tirole, 1999 and Shin, 1998). The approach taken in this
paper is fundamentally di⁄erent from all of these approaches as in our model the
5incentives of the parties attempting to in￿ uence the decision maker are outside his
or her control. Hence our decision maker could be a judge who must decide on a
case by examining presented evidence without having much control over stakes or the
resources put in by the parties supplying the same or it could be a voter deciding on
the basis of information supplied by competing candidates or a consumer choosing
among alternative brands, in￿ uenced by advertising expenses of rival companies. In
all these contexts the stakes of competing parties are typically high and external to
the decision makers. Hence our focus is mainly positive in nature as we just seek
to ￿nd possible inferential justi￿cation of functions that capture the impact of such
persuasion better than production functions do.
In this sense, our paper has more in common with the newer psychological ap-
proach to modelling persuasion such as Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmei-
dler (2005) and Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2006). While Aragones,
Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2005) formally model inference via analogies us-
ing a non-Bayesian learning model, Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2006)
present a Bayesian model of inference which incorporates associative thinking iden-
ti￿ed in the psychology literature. Our approach is closer in spirit to Mullainathan,
Schwartztein and Shleifer (2006) as they also consider a ￿limited world￿Bayesian
audience as a sub case. However, while their focus is to formalize a speci￿c psy-
chological pattern of thinking, our approach is less speci￿c. We simply assume that
the competing parties that attempt to in￿ uence the audience are aware of what
information the audience might ￿nd potentially convincing.
Before proceeding with the modeling, we brie￿ y discuss the importance of per-
suasion as an economic activity in modern economies. In modern democracies, the
importance of mobilizing voters through persuasive campaigns and lobbying politi-
cians for favors can hardly be over-emphasized.4 Besides political in￿ uence, per-
suasion has also gained signi￿cance in purely economic activities. The suppliers of
persuasion be it consulting agencies, law ￿rms or advertising conglomerates have
4As estimated by Laband and Sophocleus (1992) (see page 966), in 1985, private parties spent
approximately $4.6 billion on lobbyists, $1 billion on political action committees and $1.7 billion
on individual contributions to political candidates.
6become indispensable to the working of corporations. The size and revenue earn-
ings of law ￿rms worldwide is testimony to their importance.5 What￿ s more, these
law ￿rms also have access to litigation consultants who specialize in re￿ning trial
strategies to maximize the persuasive impact on juries. Today￿ s advertising agencies
are also multi-billion dollar industries providing an array of specialized services such
as: creating and maintaining brand loyalties, crisis management (helping companies
protect their image when under critical scrutiny), public relation strategies to mod-
erate communication within organizations and public communication strategies to
in￿ uence legislative actions, among a host of other things. Social science, even the
physical sciences, can be considered to involve costly persuasion. Otherwise, all
scienti￿cally correct hypotheses would become accepted immediately at the instant
they become formulated and proposed. Instead, what we have is a long process
of costly thought, writing, reformulation, testing and retesting, argumentation, and
so on. In such a process, the ￿truth￿and presented evidence are not the sole de-
terminants of what is accepted as true. Biases and prejudices are relevant as well.6
Overall, many parts of the service economy and their employees can be reasonably be
thought of as engaging in persuasion. Ordinary production functions cannot capture
such activities as they are fundamentally adversarial.
We motivate our models by considering a trial setting involving a court, a Plain-
ti⁄ and a Defendant. A trial setting is helpful because it is focused on establishing
the truth for a particularly narrow subject and has relatively well-de￿ned rules for
evidence production and a structured evaluation process. However our models are
not speci￿c to court settings and have applicability in several other contexts as well.
5In 2002, each of the world￿ s top three law ￿rms earned more than a billion US dollars in gross
revenues. (See 2002 Global 100 ranking of law ￿rms based on gross revenues in The American
Lawyer, November, 2002). Further, major corporations not only use outside law ￿rms but maintain
an arsenal of lawyers internally to protect their business practices in the face of litigation (See ￿Who
Defends Corporate America?￿in The National Law Journal, October 15, 2001. As per the survey,
companies like Exxon Mobil Corp. and General Electric maintain over 600 in-house lawyers). In
1985, the total estimated expenses by both the defendants and the plainti⁄s in Tort litigation in
the U.S. was approximately $17.3 billion (See Laband and Sophocleus (1992), page 964).
6Precisely such a process of scienti￿c discovery ￿whereby typically old hypotheses take much
e⁄ort to be replaced by new ones ￿has been elaborated in the seminal work by Kuhn (1996).
7We follow a Bayesian approach7 not because we think courts and individuals neces-
sarily closely follow such an inference process, but because the approach provides a
consistent structure to the inference process in a simple way.
2 The Basic Setting
For concreteness we use a court setting to lay out the building blocks of persuasion.
The prosecution or Plainti⁄ (denoted by P) and the defense or the Defendant (de-
noted by D) compete to gather and present evidence so as to in￿ uence the verdict
of the court in their favor. There are two competing hypotheses: either the Defen-
dant is guilty (G) or he is innocent (I). We consider three stages in the process of
evidence production and its assessment by the court:
1. Firstly, we posit that collection of evidence is costly; the Plainti⁄
and the Defendant expend resources Rp and Rd respectively to gather
evidence favorable to their cause. Hence, even the side arguing for the
truth, must put in e⁄ort to ￿nd any relevant evidence. Upon investing
resources, each side may obtain a piece of evidence ei in its favour where
i = p,d which it then presents to the court. We postulate evidence
production functions that specify the link between resources spent and
evidence produced and they may be either deterministic or stochastic as
will become clear in the following sections.
2. Based on the evidence presented, the court updates its prior belief
about guilt or innocence to determine its posterior beliefs. We assume
that the court uses Bayes￿rule to do so. Throughout the analysis, we
assume that the court neither observes the level of resources chosen by
either parties nor the underlying evidence production functions. Hence
the only additional information it receives over and above its priors is the
evidence pair presented at the trial.
7See Kadane and Schum (1996) for an excellent discussion on Bayesian inference from the evi-
dence presented in the Sacco and Vanzetti trial.
83. Given its posterior belief, the court makes a decision on guilt or
innocence. The nature of court￿ s decision in turn helps determine the
win probability for the Plainti⁄ and the Defendant.
Throughout the analysis, we take the resources expended in stage 1, Rp and Rd;
as given. We are mainly concerned with the construction of posterior beliefs (as
functions of Rp and Rd) in stage 2 and in the court￿ s decision based on its posterior
belief in stage 3. The key ingredient towards determining the court￿ s posterior
probability of guilt is its inferred likelihood ratio of guilt Lg which represents the






Kadane and Schum (1996), in the pioneering analysis of the Sacco and Vanzetti
trial evidence, use such likelihood ratios to estimate the probative force of the ev-
idence in establishing guilt. These ratios can be subjectively constructed directly
without having speci￿c values for the two conditional probabilities in (3).9
Let ￿ represent the prior probability of guilt and ￿￿ the posterior probability of
guilt based on the evidence presented by the two sides (i.e. ￿￿ = prob(G j ep;ed)):




(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Lg (4)
In what follows, we explore two di⁄erent evidence production processes, postulate
their impact on Lg, and accordingly, examine their e⁄ect on the posterior probability
of guilt ￿￿ and on the ￿nal decision by the target of persuasion in stage 3.





9As stated by Kadane and Schum (1996, p.127) in making a holistic assessment of the probabitive
force of evidence: ￿All that is required is a person￿ s judgement of [the likelihood ratio]; there is no
need for separate or individual values of these two conditional probabilities.￿
93 Deterministic Evidence Production and the Ad-
ditive Contest Success Function
As already mentioned, di⁄erent versions of the additive contest success function have
recently been used in applications to law and economics, marketing, advertising, and
political lobbying to model the win-probabilities of parties devoting costly resources
to in￿ uence the judgement of the relevant audience. While such functions have been
justi￿ed axiomatically or in terms of probabilistic choice, a justi￿cation for their
usage in such inferential settings is still lacking. In this section, we link evidence
production and Bayesian inference to identify su¢ cient conditions for the usage of
the additive function.
3.1 Evidence and the determination of posteriors
Let each potential piece of evidence favouring guilt or innocence (that is, ep and
ed) be on a (0, 1] scale. Suppose that, given the evidence pair (ep;ed), the court








where ￿;￿ > 0 (5)
Using the link between probabilistic reasoning and human judgements in general,
as discussed in Kadane and Schum (1996), Lg(ep;ed) in (5) can be interpreted as
the court￿ s perception of the intensity of evidence (as measured by
ep
ed) pointing
towards guilt.10 In particular, the power-law form in (5) has been identi￿ed in
10On page 163, Kadane and Schum (1996) quote David Hume from his Treatise of Human Nature
￿Thus all probabilistic reasoning is a species of sensation.... When I am convinc￿ d of any principle,
￿ tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give preference to one set of
arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of
their in￿ uence.￿Referring to Steven￿ s work in psychophysics, they interpret Hume￿ s quote as follows:
￿in Steven￿ s terms, Hume said that all probabilistic reasoning involves judgments that are prothetic
or intensive in nature.￿They also note on page 165, that ￿Stevens has gone to considerable lenghts
to show how methods and issues of interest in sensory psychophysics are applicable to human
10psychophysical experiments, where it is well established that quantitative human
perception (such as sensation of relative brightness of light or loudness of sound, as
well as judgements concerning intensity of attitudes and opinions) of stimuli follows
a power law.11 Moreover, (5) can be derived from certain probability distributions
that the court might have about the generation of the evidence.12
Next, we assume that both the Plainti⁄ and the Defendant are aware as to how
the court infers from evidence presented as per (5). Producing evidence is costly as
it depends on the amount of resources devoted by the Plainti⁄ and the Defendant.
In particular we consider the following evidence production functions: ep = Fp(Rp)
and ed = Fd(Rd) where values of evidence obtained (by Plainti⁄ and Defendant)
Fp(￿) and Fd(￿) are deterministically and monotonically increasing in resources. Via
the evidence production functions, (5) allows us to establish a direct link between
resources and the court￿ s likelihood ratio of guilt. By substituting for Lg(ep;ed) into
(4), we can express the court￿ s posterior probability of guilt as a function of resources
judgments concerning the intensity of attitudes and opinions about value related and other matters
(1966, 1972).￿ Similarly, our choice of
ep
ed as a measure of evidence intensity also relies on the
observation that ￿as Stevens noted (1975, 17), a wide variety of our [human] perceptual judgemental
capabilities rest on preservation of information about ratios rather than about di⁄erences.￿ See
Kadane and Schum (1996), page 165.
11See Stevens (1966, 1975, p13).
12For example, suppose that the court believes that prob(ep;ed j G) and prob(ep;ed j I) are
described by the following gamma distributions:







where ag and b are positive parameters and ￿(￿) is the gamma function; and







where ai > 0:











Note that this takes the same form as (5) for ￿ =
b
ai￿ag￿(ai)
￿(ag) > 0 and ￿ = ag ￿ ai > 0:
11as given by ￿￿(Rp;Rd) =
￿￿(Fp(Rp))￿
(1￿￿)(Fd(Rd))￿+￿￿(Fp(Rp))￿:
With this assumption, as the above expression reveals, the probability of guilt
as a function of resources turns out to be a generalized additive function, a result
summarized below.
Proposition 1: Assume the likelihood function is described by (5), where Fp(￿)
and Fd(￿) are deterministic evidence production functions for the Defendant and the





(1 ￿ ￿)(Fd(Rd))￿ + ￿￿(Fp(Rp))￿ (6)
The prior ￿ and the multiplicative parameter ￿ in the likelihood function (5) play
a similar role. That is, having a higher prior of guilt or weighing evidence in favor of
the Plainti⁄(and against the Defendant) more heavily increases the court￿ s posterior
of guilt. The side that puts relatively more resources tilts the verdict in its favor
by obtaining a relatively higher valued evidence. 13 The parameter ￿ is a measure
of the sensitivity of the court to the evidence and, through that, to the resources
expended (see Hirshleifer, 1989, and Jia, 2007, for interpretations of this parameter).
For brevity, from now on we set both parameters ￿ and ￿ equal to 1, and thus we




(1 ￿ ￿)Fd(Rd) + ￿Fp(Rp)
(7)
From Proposition 1 it is clear that the speci￿c form of ￿￿(Rp;Rd) depends on
the evidence production functions Fp(Rp) and Fd(Rd):In their current form, the ev-
idence production functions explicitly capture only the importance of resources on
13Indeed, given such a production process, the court￿ s inference on the basis of face value of
evidence allows it to be misled especially since we don￿ t necessarily expect the party that spends
more to be on the side of truth. Legros and Newman (2002) also allow for the possibility that by
devoting greater resources, a party can mislead the judge. In their model the party which invests
more resources into trial hires a better lawyer who can then produce an ￿interference￿or jam the
argument of the opponent￿ s lawyer from reaching the judge.
12evidence produced. However, apart from resources, it is natural to think that the
truth itself would in￿ uence evidence production too. While there is no unique way
of characterizing this, we consider the following restrictions intuitive:
When truth is on the side of the Defendant, we expect Fd(Rd) > Fp(Rp) when
Rd = Rp > 0. Similarly, when the truth is with the Plainti⁄, we expect that
Fp(Rp) > Fd(Rd) when Rd = Rp > 0:14 In particular, consider the following evidence
production functions:
ep = Fp(Rp) = ’f(Rp)
ed = Fd(Rd) = (1 ￿ ’)f(Rd)
where, when the Defendant is innocent we have ’ 2 (0; 1
2) and, similarly, when the
Defendant is guilty, ’ 2 (1
2;1): We assume that the function f(￿) is monotonically
increasing in its argument and captures the importance of resources devoted on
evidence production. The parameter ’ captures the fact that truth does matter in
the production of evidence. Given the restriction on the range of ’, it follows that
the party arguing for the truth, would be able to supply a higher valued evidence if
Rd = Rp > 0:





(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ’)f(Rd) + ￿’f(Rp)
(8)
It can be clearly seen in this additive form how the probability of guilt (and, therefore,
14While this is clearly desirable, it might not always be true. Generally, the evidence production
process would also be sensitive to the nature of dispute at hand. At times, it might be much harder
for the plainti⁄ to provide evidence in favor of its cause even when he is arguing for the truth
and vice-versa. For example, in tort litigation regarding asbestos exposure, it is di¢ cult for the
plainti⁄s to prove that their illness is caused by asbestos exposure and how serious is the potential
consequences of their current symptoms.
15Versions of this functional form have been employed, among others, by Farmer and Pecorino
(1999), Hirhsleifer and Osborne (2001), Vaidya (2005), and Robson and Skaperdas (2007).
13the probability of innocence) is a⁄ected by the three main factors: (i) The truth, as
represented by the parameter ’; (ii) the preconceptions or bias of the court, as
represent by the prior of guilt ￿; and (iii) the e⁄orts of the two sides (Rp and Rd).
One advantage of this functional form is that it can easily generalize to more that
two possibilities and to a higher number of participants.
3.2 Deciding on guilt versus innocence
So far we have seen how evidence production functions and the court￿ s inference from
the presented evidence can determine its posterior probability of guilt. However,
ultimately, we are interested in deriving the contest success functions that capture
the win probabilities as perceived by the Defendant and Plainti⁄ at the beginning
of stage 1. To do this, we must consider alternative decision rules that the court
might use to arrive at its verdict and below we present two possibilities and their
implications for Plainti⁄ and Defendant￿ s win probabilities.
Suppose that the court makes a probabilistic decision on guilt (akin to tossing
an unfair coin) as follows:
Choose G with probability ￿
￿(Rp;Rd)and I with probability 1 ￿ ￿
￿(Rp;Rd)
(Rule 1)
With the above decision rule, it is immediately obvious that the contest success
function representing the win probability of the Plainti⁄ PP(Rp;Rd) would be the
posterior probability of guilt in (7) as stated below.
Proposition 2: Suppose the contestants know the court￿ s prior with certainty





(1 ￿ ￿)Fd(Rd) + ￿Fp(Rp)
If, however, the court employs a discrete rule like ￿guilty beyond reasonable
14doubt￿ or just ￿choose guilt if and only if there is a better than even chance of
guilt,￿then (7) does not in general describe the appropriate contest success function
from the point of view of the contestants. More precisely, suppose the court￿ s decision
rule is given by:
Choose G if and only if ￿
￿(Rp;Rd) > ￿ where ￿ 2 (0;1) (Rule 2)
Obviously ￿ should be su¢ ciently close to 1 when the ￿beyond reasonable doubt￿
rule is employed and it equals 1
2 when the even-chance rule is used.
With this decision rule, if the Defendant and Plainti⁄know the prior of the court
with certainty, then it can be easily established that the contest success function is an
asymmetric perfectly-discriminatory one (or, the all-pay auction). If the contestants
do not know the court￿ s prior with certainty but rather have a common nondegenerate
distribution about the court￿ s prior (that is, the common prior of the contestants over
the court￿ s prior), then we can expect an imperfectly discriminating contest success
function. In what follows we assume a uniform prior distribution when this case
applies. In particular, consider the following proposition which describes the contest
success functions applicable when court￿ s decision rule is discrete:
Proposition 3: (i) Suppose the contestants know the court￿ s prior with certainty














(ii) Suppose the contestants have a uniform prior about the court￿ s prior and the




(1 ￿ ￿)Fp(Rp) + ￿Fd(Rd)
Proof: Please see Appendix.
15The contest success function in (i) di⁄ers from typical applications of all-pay
auctions (Hillman and Riley, 1989, Baye et. al., 1996, Che and Gale, 1998) only in
that it is asymmetric and also it does not include an outcome that has a probability
of 1/2 when the probability of guilt just equals ￿.16
In part (ii) we have a regular additive contest success function which is also
asymmetric but without the priors playing any role (because they have cancelled out
due to the uniformity of the contestant￿ s prior over the court￿ s prior) and with the
decision parameter ￿ playing an important role whenever it di⁄ers from 1/2. When
that parameter is close to 1, of course, the Plainti⁄￿ s position is hard and can be
overcome only with the investment of vastly greater resources than the Defendant or
with a much more favorable evidence production function (it helps to have the truth
with you and be able to bring evidence in its favor more easily than your opponent).
Thus, it is clear that both types of contest success functions in Proposition 3
allow for the resources, biases, and the truth to a⁄ect outcome, albeit in di⁄erent
ways and taking into account the relative di¢ culties of proving one case or the other
as indicated by the ￿handicap￿parameter ￿:
4 Stochastic Evidence production and the Di⁄er-
ence Form
In this section we examine another evidence production process where the link be-
tween resources devoted and evidence obtained is probabilistic. As before, our ul-
timate goal is to show how such a process can lead to functional forms that link
resources with the win probabilities of the contestants wishing to in￿ uence the de-
cision of the court or the relevant audience. We begin by characterizing such an
evidence production process and examine its impact on the court￿ s inference. Sup-
pose each of the two parties can produce one piece of evidence. The Plainti⁄ can
either produce evidence of guilt, denoted by ep, or o⁄er no evidence, e;: Similarly
16This latter di⁄erence, of course, could simply be eliminated by having the court ￿ ip a fair coin
when that is the case.
16the Defendant can either produce evidence in favor of innocence, denoted by ed, or
o⁄er no evidence, denoted by e;: As with the previous section, the court￿ s inference
of guilt is based purely on observed evidence and without being aware of the evi-
dence production process. Accordingly, given evidence (ek;el) (where k 2 fp;;g and
l 2 fd;;g), let Lg(ek;el) denote the court￿ s likelihood of guilt purely on the basis of
the evidence pair it observes.
Note for any given prior beliefs ￿; if ep and ed are to be potentially useful pieces











For now, we impose no other restrictions on these likelihood ratios, including on
the relationship between Lg(ep;ed) and Lg(e;;e;):
The posterior probability of guilt ￿￿(ek;el) for each pair of evidence (ek;el) will
be given by (4) using Lg(ek;el): From this it clearly follows that:
￿
￿(ep;e;) > ￿






Both the Plainti⁄and the Defendant are supposed to know the court￿ s posteriors
for any given combination of evidence. Unlike the previous section where evidence
was a deterministic function of resources expended, here the resources devoted by
either party determine the probability of ￿nding favorable piece of evidence. Let
hd(Rd) denote the probability that the Defendant will ￿nd evidence in favor of inno-
cence (ed). This probability is increasing in Rd, the resources expended on ￿nding
that evidence. Similarly, let hp(Rp) denote the probability that the Plainti⁄will ￿nd
17evidence in favor of guilt (G), with that probability also increasing in the resources
Rp.17 Thus, in terms of evidence there are four possible states of the world that
can be faced by the court: (ep;ed);(e;;ed);(ep;e;); and (e;;e;) occurring with the
following probabilities: hp(Rp)hd(Rd), [1 ￿ hp(Rp)]hd(Rd), hp(Rp)[1 ￿ hd(Rd)], and
[1 ￿ hp(Rp)][1 ￿ hd(Rd)], respectively.
Given the posterior probability of guilt that will be induced by each realized com-
bination of evidence and given the functions hp(￿) and hd(￿), the expected posterior




￿(e;;e;) + Bhp(Rp) ￿ ￿hd(Rd) + Ahp(Rp)hd(Rd) (13)
where B ￿ ￿
￿(ep;e;) ￿ ￿
￿(e;;e;) > 0;￿ ￿ ￿
￿(e;;e;) ￿ ￿
￿(e;;ed) > 0





We proceed as in the previous section by considering the two types of decision rules
that the court might use to arrive at its verdict. First, consider the case whereby
the court makes a probabilistic decision on guilt (akin to tossing an unfair coin) as
follows:
Choose G with probability ￿
￿(ek;el) and I with probability1 ￿ ￿
￿(ek;el) (Rule 1￿ )
It is then straightforward to show that the contest success function from the
viewpoint of the Plainti⁄ and the Defendant are directly obtained from (13) and it
has similar qualitative properties to the additive forms of the previous sections.
Proposition 4: Suppose the contestants know the court￿ s prior with certainty
and the court uses Rule 1￿ . Then the probability of the Plainti⁄ winning (and of the
17These probabilities should of course be related to the true state of the world; that is, the
probabilities should depend on whether the defendant is truly guilty or innocent. We shall discuss
this issue later.
18Defendant losing) is given by:18
PP(Rp;Rd) = E[￿











Proposition 4 suggests a di⁄erence-form contest success function where the win-
probability of the Plainti⁄(same as expected posterior probability of guilt) is increas-
ing in the resources Rp expended by the Plainti⁄ and decreasing in the resources
Rd expended by the Defendant. Naturally, the win probability of the Defendant
1 ￿ PP(Rp;Rd), has the reverse properties in terms of the resources expended by
each side. The parameters B and ￿ are similar and have natural interpretations.
B(￿ ￿￿(ep;e;) ￿ ￿￿(e;;e;)) represents the marginal increase in the court￿ s posterior
as a result of the Plainti⁄ producing evidence of guilt in the absence of evidence of
innocence, whereas ￿ represents the marginal decrease in the court￿ s posterior as a
result of the Defendant producing evidence of innocence in the absence of evidence
of guilt. Parameter A can take positive, zero, or negative values. If A is posi-
tive, then the Plainti⁄ has an advantage in the sense that the greater the product
hp(Rp)hd(Rd) is, the greater is the Plainti⁄￿ s probability of winning. The e⁄ect on
the Defendant would be exactly the opposite. Thus, a non-zero A confers an asym-
metric advantage to one of the contestants that is proportional to the hp(Rp)hd(Rd)
term. To better the intuition behind the value of A consider the symmetry condition
￿￿(ep;ed) = ￿￿(e;;e;)(= ￿) (see (11) and (12)). Then, A = ￿ ￿ B, and thus the
party that can induce the higher aforementioned marginal increase in the court￿ s
posterior has the signi￿cant advantage in the contest. That is, a non-zero A, and
the advantage it confers to one party, stems from the tilt that the court might have
in evaluating favorable evidence to that party versus its opponent.
We now allow for the court to use the alternative decision rule, similar to rule 2,
and derive the operative contest success functions as perceived by the two parties:
18The comparative statics can be easily veri￿ed using the restrictions in (11) and (12) and the
properties of the evidence production functions hp(:) and hd(:).
19Choose G if and only if ￿
￿(ek;el) > ￿ for every (ek;el) where ￿ 2 (0;1) (Rule 2￿ )
As with the case of deterministic evidence production in the previous section, we
consider two cases: (i) when the contestants know the court￿ s prior with certainty
and (ii) when the contestants have a uniform prior over the court￿ s prior. However,
in the second case it is convenient to parameterize the resultant posteriors in the
four states as follows:19
￿
￿(ep;ed) = ￿
￿(e;;e;) = ￿; (14)
￿
￿(e;;ed) = ￿￿ for some ￿ 2 (0;1);
￿
￿(ep;e;) = ￿￿ for some ￿ > 1
Proposition 5: (i) Suppose the contestants know the court￿ s prior with certainty




> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if ￿ 2 [￿￿;1)
hp(Rp)[1 ￿ hd(Rd)] if ￿ 2 [￿;￿￿)
1 ￿ [1 ￿ hp(Rp)]hd(Rd) if ￿ 2 [￿￿;￿)
1 if ￿ 2 (0;￿￿)
(15)
(ii) Suppose the contestants have a uniform prior about the court￿ s prior and
the court uses Rule 2￿ . Then, the probability of the Plainti⁄ winning (and of the
Defendant losing) is:
19Obviously the inequalities in (11) and (12) are satis￿ed since





1 ￿ ￿ + ￿[￿￿1
￿ hp(Rp) ￿ 1￿￿
￿ hd(Rd) + (1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿1
￿ )hp(Rp)hd(Rd)] if ￿ > ￿





hp(Rp) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)hd(Rd)





)hp(Rp)hd(Rd) if ￿ ￿ ￿
(16)
Proof: Please see Appendix.
The form in part (i) is a mixture of the all-pay auction and a probabilistic contest
success function. In settings in which the cut-o⁄ parameter ￿ is su¢ ciently close to
the prior ￿ , the probabilistic part would apply and the choices by the contestants
have an e⁄ect. When ￿ is close enough to 1 (and higher than ￿￿), as it could be
in the ￿beyond all reasonable doubt￿case, there is nothing the Plainti⁄ can do to
increase the expected probability of winning beyond zero.
Perhaps of more applied interest is the form in part (ii), especially when ￿ > ￿.
In particular, when 1￿￿
￿ = ￿￿1
￿ , the probability of winning for each party depends
only on the di⁄erence between hp(Rp) and hd(Rd) (i.e. on hp(Rp) ￿ hd(Rd)) barring
a constant term. Further, when ￿ = 1=2, as we might expect it to be in cases of















The function in (17) resembles the piece-wise linear di⁄erence form contest ex-
plored by Che and Gale (2000). However, there are important di⁄erences. (17) has
inferential foundations and it can be non-linear in Rp and Rd with hp and hd inter-
preted as probabilities and bounded naturally between 0 and 1. Also notice that
in (17), the parameter ￿ depends on the parameters ￿ and ￿ which represent the
force of the evidence ￿against the Defendant when ￿ is high and in favor of her
when ￿ is low ￿by the court. The higher is ￿ and the lower is ￿, the higher is ￿
and the easier it is to convince the court in a contestant￿ s favor, conditional on one
21contestant producing evidence and the opponent not producing any evidence. But
in expectation, under symmetry, no side has an advantage although they both have
a greater return to their resource investment the higher is ￿:
As with the previous section, even with stochastic evidence production, we would
also expect the truth to play a role in uncovering evidence apart from resources and
the functional forms in Propositions 4 and 5 can accommodate this feature easily.
To see this, suppose for all R we can expect to have hp(R;G) > hp(R;I), where
G;I represent the truth. That is, we can expect it to be easier for the Plainti⁄ to
￿nd evidence of guilt when Defendant is guilty than when the Defendant is innocent.
Similarly, for all R we can expect hd(R;G) < hd(R;I). How much easier or more
di¢ cult it is to ￿nd favorable evidence will of course depend on the particular cir-
cumstances, on the particular ￿technology￿of evidence production. Following the
example of Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) and others, one way of parameterizing
the two functions is to have hp(Rp) = ￿h(Rp) and hd(Rd) = (1 ￿ ￿)h(Rd), for some
increasing function h(￿), ￿ > 1=2 when the Defendant is guilty, and ￿ < 1=2 when
the Defendant is innocent. The closer ￿ is to 1 (when the Defendant is guilty) or
the closer it is to 0, the more discerning of the truth can the technology of evidence
production be thought of. The functional forms in propositions 4 and 5 can easily
capture such a truth-sensitive evidence production process, by simply substituting
for hp(:) and hd(:) using the above functions.
5 Concluding remarks
Contest success functions have been used in a variety of economic applications that
involve attempts by contending parties to in￿ uence the opinion or judgement of an
audience by devoting costly resources into evidence production. In this paper, we
provide an explicit inferential justi￿cation for using such functions and by doing so
provide a better foundation for a substantial body of existing research. In partic-
ular, by envisaging di⁄erent types of evidence production functions, we derive two
functional forms that provide an explicit link between resources devoted and their
impact on the court￿ s inference about the truth and its verdict. One of the func-
22tional forms happens to be the relatively well-known additive function which has
been recently used to model the winning probabilities of contestants in rent-seeking,
litigation, election campaigns, advertising, and other settings. We also uncover a less
well-known di⁄erence functional form (similar to Che and Gale (2000)) which could
also be suitably applied to such settings. By linking the contest success functions
to a Bayesian inference process, we are able to clearly distinguish the role played by
priors, the truth and the resources in in￿ uencing the relevant audience￿ s judgement
by both re-interpreting known parameters and introducing new parameters in these
functional forms. Notice also that while the functional forms demarcate the role of
priors from the impact of resources in any given period, in a dynamic setting they
would also indirectly allow for resources put into evidence production in the current
period to in￿ uence future priors assuming the current period posterior would become
next period￿ s prior. Thus, these functions would be useful in a variety of settings,
examining broadly the link between costly adversarial production of evidence or ar-
guments and an audience￿ s judgment given its initial set of priors or biases. Hence,
to provide but a few examples, these functions can be suitably employed to better ex-
plore the links between campaign contributions and electoral outcomes, advertising
expenditures and creation of ￿brand loyalty￿among many others.
More generally, the interpretation of persuasion as a contest forces one to think
about its inputs very di⁄erently from those of traditional production functions. This
is because, a main substantive di⁄erence between contest success functions and pro-
duction functions is that the inputs in the former are combined adversarially whereas
in the latter they are combined cooperatively. Then, in contrast to ordinary produc-
tion large increases in the inputs of persuasion as employed by all contestants could
well yield no change in the ￿nal outcome (the probability of winning for each ad-
versary). In the case of litigation, for example, a plainti⁄ and a defendant can both
dramatically increase their legal expenditures without changing their probabilities of
winning in court (or, the probability of the court discovering the truth). Similarly,
lobbying organizations advocating opposing policies can have the same probabilities
of prevailing with widely di⁄erent levels of expenditures. Given that much economic
activity in modern economies, especially in the service sector, involves such adversar-
23ial combination of inputs, we must be careful to not evaluate these activities in the
same cooperative way as contributions of traditional inputs are valued in light of the
standard production theory. Exploring further, then, the theoretical and empirical
implications of the adversarial combination of inputs that is found in such contests
of persuasion would be a natural next step.
24APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3, (i): Given Rule 2 and the form of ￿￿(Rp;Rd) in (7),
the Plainti⁄ will win if and only if:
￿Fp(Rp)
(1 ￿ ￿)Fd(Rd) + ￿Fp(Rp)
> ￿






Since both Fp(￿) and Fd(￿) are deterministic functions of their respective argu-
ments and ￿ is known with certainty, we obtain the probability of winning in (i).
Proof of Proposition 3, (ii): As in part (i), Rule 2 and the form of ￿￿(Rp;Rd)
in (7) imply:
￿Fp(Rp)
(1 ￿ ￿)Fd(Rd) + ￿Fp(Rp)
> ￿
or for any given prior ￿, we have
￿ >
￿Fd(Rd)
(1 ￿ ￿)Fp(Rp) + ￿Fd(Rd)
Given our assumption that ￿ follows uniform distribution over [0;1], the proba-









(1 ￿ ￿)Fp(Rp) + ￿Fd(Rd)
=
(1 ￿ ￿)Fp(Rp)
(1 ￿ ￿)Fp(Rp) + ￿Fd(Rd)
25which is the form in part (ii) of the proposition￿ s statement. QED
Proof of Proposition 5, (i): There are four possible states (ek;el) in calcu-
lating the (ex ante) probability. Given the decision rule , in each state the court will
decide with certainty whether to rule in favor of the Plainti⁄ or not depending on
whether ￿￿(ek;el) is greater or smaller than ￿ .
When ￿ 2 [￿￿;1); there is no state in which the court can rule in favor of the
Plainti⁄ and therefore PP(Rp;Rd) = 0 in this case.
When ￿ 2 [￿;￿￿); the court decides in favor of the Plainti⁄only in state (ep;e;):
Thus, in this case we have PP(Rp;Rd) = hp(Rp)[1 ￿ hd(Rd)]1 = hp(Rp)[1 ￿ hd(Rd)]:
When ￿ 2 [￿￿;￿); the court decides in favor of the Plainti⁄in states (ep;e;);(ep;ed);
and (e;;e;), and against the Plainti⁄in state (e;;ed); yielding PP(Rp;Rd) = 1￿[1￿
hp(Rp)]hd(Rd):
Finally, when ￿ 2 (0;￿￿); the court decides in favor of the Plainti⁄ in all states
and thus PP(Rp;Rd) = 1:
Proof of Proposition 5, (ii): The Plainti⁄ is aware that for any given pair
of resource investment (Rp;Rd); one of the four alternative states (ek;el) will exist.
In each state, depending on the realized value of ￿ the Plainti⁄ will have a chance
of getting the verdict in his or her favor if and only if ￿ is such that ￿￿(ek;el) > ￿:
We ￿rst suppose that ￿ > ￿ so that the Plainti⁄ has a positive probability
of winning in each state. To identify the Plainti⁄￿ s probability of winning in each
alternative state, lets￿examine each of them separately as follows.
State (ep;e;) :
This state occurs with an ex-ante probability of hp(Rp)[1￿hd(Rd)] and ￿￿(ep;e;) =
￿￿: Hence in this state, the Plainti⁄ wins if ￿￿ > ￿ or ￿ >
￿
￿: Given uniform distri-








This state occurs with an ex-ante probability of hp(Rp)hd(Rd) and ￿￿(ep;ed) = ￿:
Hence in this state, the Plainti⁄ wins if ￿ > ￿: Given uniform distribution of ￿, this
occurs with probability (1 ￿ ￿):
State (e;;e;) :
26This state occurs with an ex-ante probability of (1 ￿ hp(Rp))(1 ￿ hd(Rd)) and
￿￿(e;;e;) = ￿: Hence in this state, the Plainti⁄ wins if ￿ > ￿: Given uniform distri-
bution of ￿, this occurs with probability (1 ￿ ￿):
State (e;;ed) :
This state occurs with an ex-ante probability of (1￿hp(Rp))hd(Rd) and ￿￿(e;;ed) =
￿￿: Hence in this state, the Plainti⁄ wins if ￿￿ > ￿ or ￿ >
￿
￿ . Given uniform distri-







Using the above information, it is easy to appreciate that the Plainti⁄￿ s ex-ante















By suitable re-arrangement, the above expression reduces to: 1￿￿+￿[￿￿1
￿ hp(Rp)￿
1￿￿
￿ hd(Rd) + (1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿1
￿ )hp(Rp)hd(Rd)]:
When ￿ ￿ ￿,
￿
￿ ￿ 1 and the ￿ term vanishes from the above expression. Then,
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